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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians to take up the true political craft and practice 
the true politics. ~Socrates1 
 
Socrates believed that his philosophical project, of interrogating the elites of Athens 
about their beliefs, therefore forcing them to question themselves and admit the limits and 
inadequacies of their knowledge, was the “true political craft.”  Socrates attempted to shift the 
focus of political dialogue towards the soul in a way that was deeply unsettling, eventually 
leading to his execution.  Though late-modern democracies differ from Socrates’s Athens in 
almost every respect, I believe that citizens can still benefit from Socratic teaching.  I believe that 
Socrates’s call for Athenians to look to and care for their souls can be useful for citizens trying to 
vivify democratic institutions and act justly.   
This project will make three main claims.  First, late-modern democracies present citizens 
with a unique set of challenges that require rethinking the conception of citizenship as a static 
category that simply classifies individuals.  Instead, I will contend that citizenship must be 
understood as a process, in which citizens must continually work upon themselves to vivify 
democratic institutions and act democratically in spheres outside of politics as generally 
understood.  Second, citizens should cultivate a particular ethos of what Stephen White calls 
“presumptive generosity,” which “is intended as an initial response designed to restrain the 
resentment and hostility we otherwise tend to bring into public engagement.”2  This ethos 
challenges one’s own identity claims, and is focused on the presencing of difference and the 
proliferation of identity claims.  Third, this ethos requires that citizens “care” for themselves.  
This care requires a type of self-reflection that problematizes the subject’s conception of self, 
                                                 
1
 Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianoplis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997), 517b. 
2
 Stephen White, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 96. 
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exposing that her identity is constituted by difference and is more ambiguous and problematic 
than she had previously believed.  In turn, this self-reflection requires a “mirror;” to gain this 
self-knowledge citizens must engage in dialogues with others, and themselves, which works to 
presence the contingency of these identity claims.3  I contend that these engagements with 
difference are critical to cultivate an ethos of presumptive generosity.  By problematizing their 
own strong identity claims and recognizing the difference and contingency inherent in them, 
citizens can become more attuned to difference in others, resisting the urge to turn difference into 
something that must be converted or destroyed. 
Chapter 1 will describe Stephen White’s conception of “presumptive generosity” in 
greater detail through an analysis of his recent book, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen.  This 
ethos is valuable for two critical reasons.  First, it shifts the terrain of politics away from 
institutions and structures to the practices that citizens must undertake to live and act 
democratically.  Second, the ethos of presumptive generosity itself is valuable in that it restrains 
our impulse to turn difference into a threat.  By adopting an ethos of a host or pilgrim, White 
argues that citizens can work to create a more tolerant and pluralistic society.  However, I will 
argue that White insufficiently articulates how one is to cultivate such an ethos.  Despite his 
gestures at the end of his book, he fails to provide a method for citizens to develop presumptive 
generosity. 
Chapter 2 attempts to articulate such a method by turning to Plato’s dialogue, the 
Alcibiades.  Here Socrates attempts to convince the young Alcibiades that he must care for his 
soul before entering politics.  This involves a type of reflective self-knowledge in which the 
subject uses a mirror to see herself “in itself.”  The reflection in the mirror shows the subject who 
                                                 
3
 I will use two variations of the word ‘other(s)’ throughout this paper.  I use others both to meanpeople who I am 
not and people perceived as belonging to a different identity group.  When I use Others I am implying that this 
person’s differences are viewed as a threat or danger to my own being. 
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she is, not what she has; it shows the subject her own soul.  I contend that this practice of caring 
for oneself can be extricated from its Platonic context, by arguing that a certain type of 
friendship can be used as a mirror rather than relying on Plato’s mirror of God.  I will provide a 
reading of the Alcibiades that focuses on Socratic dialogue as a method of caring for oneself as it 
problematizes ones own deeply held beliefs. 
In Chapter 3, I will return to late-modern democracy and argue that this method of self-
cultivation can inculcate an ethos of presumptive generosity.  By reflecting back upon oneself 
and challenging one’s own identity claims, caring for the self helps citizens to realize the 
contingency of identity, allowing them to be more generous when they encounter difference.  I 
will utilize Romand Coles’s theory of receptivity and tabling as a model for how citizens should 
practice self-cultivation.  Coles argues that citizens should engage in dialogue with others in 
order to shift their own predispositions, but should approach these dialogues intending to listen, 
rather than persuade.  He further argues that instead of engaging in these dialogues at a public 
deliberative table, citizens should physically move the sites of these dialogues out of their 
comfort zones to where others live.  I will argue that this model of dialogue can help citizens 
cultivate an ethos that is attuned to difference. 
First and foremost I would like to thank John Baltes, who has guided this project since its 
infancy.  His thoughtful comments and critical analysis have forced me to hone my ideas and 
have substantially improved my arguments.  I would also like to thank John Lombardini for his 
assistance and comments.  His expertise was uniquely helpful in framing Chapter 2’s reading of 
Plato.  I thank Chris Freiman for serving on my committee and reading drafts of this project.  I 
also thank the Charles Center at the College of William and Mary for providing me a Monroe 
Scholar grant to conduct research in the summer of 2010.  A slightly altered version of Chapter 2 
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was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association’s Annual National Conference in 
April of 2011, and I thank those who provided helpful comments and questions for my project.  I 
would like to thank Connor Bost, Nikolai Vandalov, Alex Rangel, Ishan Bardhan, Adam Stokes, 
and Skyler Reidy who proofread early drafts of this paper.  I would finally like to thank 
Katherine Hayden for proofreading a draft of the entire manuscript. 
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Chapter 1: White and Citizenship—An Ethos of Presumptive Generosity 
 
In The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen, Stephen White argues that late-modern 
democracies face a set of challenges that require citizens to rethink both their role in democratic 
politics and the nature of citizenship itself.  White identifies five sites that shape the 
contemporary theoretical landscape, which require citizens to respond in accordance to what 
White views as critical criteria for a reasonable response: “moral attentiveness and self-
restraint.”4  The first site regards forming just political and social institutions.  The second 
involves reflection upon and expression of the sources or foundations of our moral intuitions and 
political judgments.  The third site requires reasonable responses to competing claims for identity 
recognition.  The fourth entails the need to expand moral imaginations to respond to human 
rights and global justice claims beyond both geopolitical and moral boundaries.  The final site 
involves speculating about the future of democratic governance in response to the shifting 
dynamics of democracy.5  In each of these five sites, White argues that cultivating an ethos of 
presumptive generosity, or “attentiveness and a gratitude toward the presencing of being,” can 
help reorient predispositions towards others in a way that helps to restrain impulses to transform 
other people into dangerous Others, to see them as people rather than threats to be defeated.  
For White, this ethos has two interrelated facets.  The first facet requires rethinking the 
ontological sources of human beings.  White argues that we should understand being as an 
“agonistic becoming or presencing of life.”6  Shifting our understanding and relationship to being 
in this way further requires that we approach ontological questions with openness in a way that 
                                                 
4
 White, Ethos, 8. 
5
 Ibid., 8. 
6
 Ibid., 48. 
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respects this presencing rather than forcing it into a mold of an idealized human being.7  Building 
from this first facet, the second facet is the requirement of restraint.  Drawing on the work of 
William Connolly, White argues that despite the constant interplay between identity and 
difference, subjects still face the temptation to transform other people’s differences into 
something threatening and dangerous.  As Connolly argues, “unfettered by other influences the 
politics of moral identity all too readily transcendetalizes violence against the other.”8  In each of 
the five sites, citizens will be confronted by difference and must resist the temptation to 
demonize this difference.  An ethos of presumptive generosity shifts the predispositions of 
citizens when they encounter difference, but should not be understood merely as tolerance.  
Presumptive generosity is not merely a ‘letting be’ of other human beings but as an active 
affirmation of difference. 
This chapter will address White’s argument for a late-modern ethos of presumptive 
generosity.  I will make two arguments.  First, the value of White’s project is the articulation of 
an ethos that attempts to shift the focus of political theory and citizenship from questions of 
institutional structure to what White calls “living these structures.”  By arguing that these 
challenges to democracy cannot be solved through juridical models, this ethos reorients political 
discussion.  Instead of looking for legislative solutions to craft institutions or expand moral 
imagination, White transfers the burden towards citizens and their responses to these challenges.  
This move also broadens our traditional notions of oppression.  No longer should citizens be 
solely concerned with oppression at the hands of political institutions, but further forms of 
                                                 
7
 One can also see parallels to his earlier work in Sustaining Affirmation. See Stephen K. White, Sustaining 
Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  He 
argues for a weak ontological sketch of the self which offers “figurations of human being in terms of certain 
existential realities, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality, and the articulation of ‘sources of the 
self,’” that “for weak ontology, human being is the negotiation of these existential realities (9)”.  
8
 William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), xviii. 
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oppression stemming from economic inequality, social norms, and other forms of stigmatization.   
My second argument is  that White’s account of this ethos assumes that citizens are already 
predisposed towards presumptive generosity; citizens who are not so predisposed may not see 
the value in cultivating such an ethos and even those who do may not be able to overcome 
cultural and historical pressures to transform other people into threatening Others.  My purpose 
in this chapter is not to undermine White’s project but to contribute to this discussion, as the 
need for a method to cultivate this ethos underscores the value that I feel White’s project has. 
This chapter will have three main sections.  In the first section I will analyze how White 
constructs his ethos of presumptive generosity as an attempt to respond to the challenges facing 
late-modern democracies.  In doing so, this section will address how White attempts to ground 
his ethos of presumptive generosity in the shared burden of mortality.  The second section will 
focus on the value of such an ethos.  I will focus not on how this ethos addresses the five sites 
that White identifies, but on the broader move of shifting the terms of political theory from 
institutional questions to the roles and responsibilities of citizens.  In the final section I will 
articulate my criticism of White, arguing that he fails to clearly articulate how one is to cultivate 
such an ethos.  I will attempt to address this problem in chapters two and three. 
I: A Late-Modern Ethos 
 White’s construction of an ethos of presumptive generosity involves two steps.  First, he 
argues that the challenges facing late-modern democracies require reconsidering the idea of the 
liberal modern subject in favor of a more agonistic subject.  This subject must recognize the play 
of identity\difference inherent in her own being instead of viewing her identity as settled, thus 
disrupting her preconceived notions.  Second, White attempts to articulate a new grounding for 
certain liberal values, most notably human dignity.  White argues that these values can no longer 
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be grounded on “strong” ontological sources such as God or Nature.  Instead, he attempts to 
ground these values in the shared subjection to human finitude that all humans face.  This section 
will analyze these two arguments. 
 White presents the common modern conception of the liberal subject as:  
He is conceived as disengaged from his social background and oriented toward 
mastery of the world that confronts him; nevertheless, he can discover, by light of 
reason, universally applicable principles of justice, grounded in some 
foundationalist account of God, nature, progress, or human communication that 
can become the basis of a constructive political consensus with other individuals.9 
 
While White finds several aspects of this account of subjectivity problematic, he focuses on two 
aspects: the idea of a disengaged self who can uncover absolute principles and the premise that 
there are strong foundational accounts that “animate” these selves.10  Building on his previous 
work, White attempts to construct a “weak” ontological account of subjectivity.  He describes 
what he calls a sticker subject in contrast to a “Teflon” subject that “is envisioned as power itself 
through natural and social obstacles; it dreams ultimately of frictionless motion.”11  Instead of 
this self-constituting subject, White envisions human beings that are already bound up in certain 
ways to certain existential conditions that they cannot truly escape or fully articulate.12  In 
contrast to a strong ontological source, these conditions, or weak ontological sources, do not 
fully determine subjects, nor can they be an absolute ground to any moral or political system.  In 
contrast, these sources are “misconstrued when grasped either as something with a truth that 
reveals itself to us in an unmediated way or as something that is simply a matter of radical 
choice.”13   
                                                 
9
 White, Ethos, 33-34.  White’s emphasis indicates what he and other theorists find problematic about this 
conception of the subject. 
10
 Ibid., 35. 
11
 White, Sustaining Affirmation, 4. 
12
 Ibid., 9. 
13
 Ibid. 
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 White attempts to construe these weak ontological sources as coming from an agonistic 
account of being, but attempts to do so without reverting to Carl Schmitt’s account of agonism.14  
While White admires Chantal Mouffe’s appropriation of Schmitt’s ontology, he fears that this 
pure agonism cannot provide a strong enough justification for liberal values that he requires.  
Subjects may adhere to such values when it is beneficial, but “when the strategic circumstances 
shift, and these ideals possibly become obstacles to these interests, I see no basis for imagining 
these subjects doing anything other than discarding liberal, pluralist niceties.”15  Though White 
finds Schmittian ontology valuable for displacing the idea of the modern liberal subject, he wants 
to avoid the implication that this agonism necessitates a politics of pure confrontation.   
 To contrast Schmitt, White turns to Friedrich Nietzsche and William Connolly.  Drawing 
on Nietzsche’s early essay “Homer’s Contest,” White argues for a distinction between agonism 
and antagonism.  According to Nietzsche, Eris, the goddess of conflict, is actually two goddesses 
who compete.  One promotes conflict in the form of war, while the other takes the form of 
competition.16  Nietzsche argues that part of the ethos of Greek nobility was the ability to restrain 
agonism from devolving into antagonism.17  This articulation of agnoism fits within White’s 
articulation of a weak ontology.  While the subject is constituted by agonism, she is not 
committed to antagonism, but can work to restrain such impulse and act graciously towards 
others.  White grants that this restraint is in part produced by the Greek ethos; magnanimity is 
praised while hubris is demonized.  While White argues that his ethos of presumptive generosity 
                                                 
14
 White describes Schmitt’s ontological account of the subject as one imbedded purely in relationships of friendship 
and opposition.  “The work of the Schmittian subject is, first and foremost, that of struggling agasint the enemy who 
threatens its collective identity.” White, Ethos, 37. 
15
 Ibid., 39. 
16
 Ibid., 40. 
17
 Ibid., 41.  See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” in On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-
Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  “But for the ancients, the aim of 
agonistic education was the well-being of the whole, of state society…every Athenian was to develop himself, 
through the contest, to the degree to which this self was of most to use to Athens and would cause least damage” 
(178-179). 
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must go further than the Greek inclination towards generosity, his appropriation of Nietzschean 
agonism is compatible with his ultimate goal of presumptive generositity. 
 White then turns to Connolly’s conception of identity\difference.  For Connolly identity 
and difference are in continual play; an identity can only be defined in relationship to its 
differences and simultaneously is imbued with its own contradictions and ambiguities.  “Identity 
is thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and 
vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert 
definitions applied to them.”18  Connolly’s account of identity, based on difference and agonism, 
does not necessitate the type of pure conflict to which Schmitt dooms politics.  Instead, “the 
kinds and degrees of conflict in a given society are dependent on how pliant or resistant citizens 
are to a whole set of ‘temptations’ or ‘pressures’ to fundamentalize the play of identity and 
difference.”19  Therefore, a subject can cultivate a certain ethos that allows her to appreciate and 
allow difference to presence itself, rather than crystallizing difference as a threat to her own 
identity.20 
 This conception of agonism allows White to move beyond the disengaged self of liberal 
theory, but does provide a strong enough ground for human dignity that is a prerequisite for his 
ethos of presumptive generosity.  This grounding is crucial to address the problem of distance, 
whether geographical, cultural, economic, or political, and therefore requires a sense of 
connectedness that can move subjects towards presumptive generosity rather than towards a 
fundamentalist response.  Whereas earlier accounts of subjectivity may have employed God, 
                                                 
18
 William Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithica: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), 64. 
19
 White, Ethos, 41.  See also Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization, xii.  “This correlation between pluralization and 
fundamentalization is not accidental, for each conditions the other: each drive to pluralization is countered by a 
fundamentalism that claims to be authorized by a god or by nature.” 
20
 Connolly calls this notion “Critical Responsiveness” and argues that it is a way to engage the play of identity and 
difference in a way that resists the temptation to absolutize difference as fundamentalism.  Connolly, Ethos of 
Pluralization, xvi-xvii 
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Nature, or some other “strong” foundational account, White finds this problematic.  He requires 
some foundation or grounding for human dignity that is coherent with his account of agonistic 
subjects. 
 White attempts to ground this connectedness on the interaction between human 
capaciousness and human finitude.  White defines capaciousness as “the meaning-making of a 
meaning-seeking creature.”21  For White, human beings continually try to formulate and express 
a meaning for themselves.  However, rather than a disengaged self trying to master the world, 
White’s ontology casts human beings as always bound up in the imperfect articulation of 
ontological sources.22  Ceding to the theistic critique, White admits that capaciousness alone is 
not enough to ground human dignity.23  “Without this sort of underlying affirmation, our respect 
for the other’s dignity or worth is deeply susceptible to disappointment, frustration and 
resentment, dispositions that can easily slide towards feelings of hostility.”24  Unwilling to revert 
to theism or risk the liberal values that he cherishes, White articulates the shared burden of 
mortality as a ground for the connectedness between human beings.  He describes mortality as “a 
burden under which we continually struggle, and for which we seek a mode of comprehension 
that embeds the awareness of that struggle in our everyday life as a countervailing force to the 
momentum we draw from our sense of ourselves as capacious agents.”25  White’s conception of 
mortality as a burden isn’t simply the awareness that we are mortal beings, but that our finitude 
acts as a restraining force upon human capaciousness.  While human beings attempt to seek and 
                                                 
21
 White, Ethos, 51. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., 55. White cites Waldron’s articulation of Locke, in which the values enshrined by liberalism are inherently 
reliant on some account of God.  It is only through Reason that we recognize that we are all God’s creatures and 
therefore demand a certain amount of dignity and respect.  Any secular attempt to articulate these values without an 
ontological source will always end in a failed justification.  See also Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke and Equality: 
Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.  12-14, 
44-45, 81-82) 
24
 Ibid., 57. 
25
 Ibid., 66. 
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create meaning for their lives, their finitude always cuts these projects short.  Every attempt to 
fully articulate ourselves remains incomplete.  White argues that once individuals have 
abandoned strong ontological sources for human being, they remain struggling without any 
transcendent guarantees of completeness or finality.26   
 Drawing on Connolly, White argues that this shared burden of mortality not only reigns 
in untamed capaciousness, but also creates an inherent connection between human beings.  He 
argues that “my particular identity as an agent emerges from multilayered processes of isolating 
certain qualities from the abundance of this becoming.”27  In this account, human beings are not 
isolated disengaged individuals, but construct their identity from the interplay of 
identity\difference.  This conception of finitude allows White to construct weak ties of 
community between individuals. Subjects must recognize their common fate of finitude and their 
inability to master the world.  White’s ethos hopes to achieve a stronger tie of community that 
other secular accounts of human dignity.28  Subjects are always dependent on others in their 
attempts to articulate their own being; engaging the differences that subjects find in others can 
aid in their own self articulation by exposing them to contingencies in identity they had not 
previously encountered or imagined. 
 From this move, White’s ethos begins to take shape.  He argues that this ethos is 
precisely needed because of his account of human being.  Because of the anxiety of human 
finitude, there is always a temptation to “script that which is other to me into roles that portray it 
as alien, threatening, dangerous, or evil.”29  White argues that citizens, instead of succumbing to 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 67.  Rorty makes a similar argument: “human life is the working out of a sophisticated idiosyncratic fantasy, 
and as a reminder that no such working out gets completed before death interrupts.  It cannot get completed because 
there is nothing to complete, there is only a web of relations to be rewoven, a web which time lengthens every day.”  
Richard Rorty, Contingency Irony Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 42-43. 
27
 White, Ethos, 67. 
28
 Ibid., 74. 
29
 Ibid., 68. 
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a fear of finitude and transforming difference a threat, should cultivate an ethos that can  restrain 
these temptations, precisely at the times that these pressures are the strongest.  White concedes 
that this bond may be weak and ephemeral, but argues that these brief spaces of connectedness 
can help shift predispositions towards the other.  As an example, he points to the final scene of 
the Illiad in which Priam requests that Hector’s body be returned to Troy.  White believes that 
“what is stunning about the meeting is the fact that vivified consciousness of mortality allowed 
any bond, however slender, to emerge.”30 He argues that it is necessary to adopt such an ethos of 
a generous host that can temper our impulse to otherize, at least momentarily, to create space for 
solidarity.   
II: Shifting the Terms of Politics 
 In this section, I address what is valuable about White’s project: it shifts the terms of 
political theory away from questions of institutional form towards how citizens are to act in order 
to vivify these institutions and the type of ethos they must adopt to engage in this project.  
Therefore, I will eschew a lengthy discussion of whether or not White’s ethos is able to 
successfully handle the challenges that face late-modern democracy.  Instead I will focus on how 
his responses to these challenges work to change predispositions rather than present political 
solutions.  For White these challenges are sites for citizens to act democratically rather than for 
institutional fixes. 
 White begins this reorientation by using J.S. Mill as a way to understand the goals of his 
project.  He argues that while Mill supports the creation of liberal institutions to protect 
individuals from the arbitrary use of state power, he is more concerned with micropolitical 
actions that can be just, if not more, oppressive.  Mill “is also concerned with a broader ethos of 
citizenship that will help motivate individuals to go beyond the minimum obligation to obey just 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 76. 
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laws.”31  Mill’s purpose is not merely criminalize racist actions, but to cultivate citizens who 
resist racism in the public sphere.  Mill’s focus is an attempt to protect individuals from an 
unlegislated tyranny of the majority where certain modes of being are excluded because they 
haven’t been considered by the majority.  Instead of relying on purely juridical protections for 
individuals, Mill wants to cultivate citizens that will act justly even in cases where the law does 
not require it. 
 White accepts the basic premise of Mill’s argument, but wants to push it further.  Where 
Mill is attempting to enshrine a baseline cautionary principle of toleration, White is attempting to 
cultivate a more active ethos that goes beyond simply letting others be.  Presumptive generosity 
“requires from us an at least temporarily more unsettling engagement with the other…this ethos 
expresses an ontological awareness of the way in which political engagement is entangled with 
the dynamics of identity formation and consolidation.”32  White is drawing two distinctions.  
First, toleration is content at simply letting others be different.  Presumptive generosity forces 
subjects to actively engage the other in order to unsettle their notions of identity.  A 
presumptively generous subject cannot live excluded from difference and merely be tolerant, but 
must continually confront difference.  Second, each has a different conception of identity.  
Where toleration views identity as static principles and then attempts to craft tempered responses 
to these prefixed sets, presumptive generosity challenges this view, arguing instead that identity 
is not pregiven but is mutually constituted by difference.33   
 This further move required by presumptive generosity can be illustrated by White’s 
critique of a Rawlsian response to the first site of crafting just institutions.  Like White, Rawls 
has requirements of reasonableness and restraint when crafting just institutions.  Rawls wants to 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 17. 
32
 Ibid., 105.  
33
 Ibid., 105-106. 
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achieve a “standard of fairness” within a pluralist society, in which all members would respect 
fellow citizens despite differences within this society.34  White’s concern is that this standard of 
fairness might not be strong enough to incur restraint when confronted with radical difference, as 
Rawls limits toleration to those that “can be plausibly be seen as within the bounds of reasonable 
pluralism.”35  Again, White seems to be operating on a different plane than Rawls.  Rawls’s 
solutions are presupposed in his project, as he is attempting provide a structural argument for 
human dignity and justice without initially grounding these values.36  Instead, White is willing to 
subject traditional justifications for these values to questioning, favoring an articulation of a 
more robust ethos.  His purpose is to shift the theoretical terrain.  “Such an ethos inquires not 
only about the justness of basic structures but also about how we go about ‘living…the 
structures’…we must be concerned with everyday dispositions and motivations as we are with 
fundamental structures.”37  White is not satisfied by erecting just institutions, but requires the 
cultivation of a citizenry that can vivify such institutions. 
 White’s shift can also be seen in his response to the fifth site concerning the prospects for 
democracy.  He identifies this as a problem with three main facets: increasing economic 
inequality, shifts in the nature of the democratic populace, and the loss of faith in the demos to 
animate political life.38  These problems cannot be solved through institutional means, as the 
institutions themselves are under threat; this site requires some work on the part of citizens to 
vivify and rejuvenate them.  Additionally, White opposes another popular move by theorists, 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., 15. 
35
 Ibid.  Rawls argues that we must “assess the strength of people’s claims, not only against our claims, but against 
one another, or on our common practices and institutions, all this giving rise to difficulties in our making sound 
reasonable judgments.”  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 56. 
36
 White, Ethos, 16. 
37
 Ibid., 16-17 
38
 Ibid., 77. 
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embracing the idea of a “democracy to come,” or a “fugitive democracy.”39  He fears that the 
bleakness of these theories can limit our political imagination.  White finds fault with these 
theories both for their vague abstractions as well as their seemingly apolitical nature, fearing that 
these theories will eschew actions by citizens, in favor for some “democracy to come.”  White 
contrasts his ethos of presumptive generosity with both of these solutions.  For him, both fail to 
engage in the necessary ontological questioning that he views as requisite in late-modernity.  
Where Rawls assumes the validity of liberal values of dignity and fairness, Wolin and Derrida 
make sweeping claims about the bleakness of the prospects for democracy.  White argues that 
this is because of certain ontological assumptions that their political projects are grounded in.40  
Instead White’s ethos forces subjects to be more attentive to their ontological prefigurations in 
order to foster the presencing of difference in others.  
 In contrast to these pessimistic portraits of democracy that eschew the responsibility for 
political activity to some nebulous fugitive entity, White casts presumptive generosity as a 
valuable way for citizens to participate and enhance democratic structures.  Presumptive 
generosity is an active predisposition that responds to the “emergence of new identities as well as 
the way in which they tend to provoke discomfort, resentment, and hostility from established 
constituencies.”41  This ethos shifts the focus of political activity to the responsibility of 
democratic citizens for their own responses to the shifting features of democracy.  Where Rawls, 
Wolin, and Derrida argue for absolute solution for political questions, White follows Connolly 
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towards what he calls a “rhizomatic” theory.42  He finds this model valuable, because instead of 
embracing a single path for politics stemming from a universal conception of value or identity, it 
favors fluctuating and dynamic bases for democracy.  His ethos opens up ontological questioning 
that aims at both disrupting totalizing political theories as well as vivifying democratic 
institutions. 
 Here, Bonnie Honig’s distinction between virtù and virtue theories can contribute to 
situating White’s ethos within the terms of political theory.  She argues that while “virtue” 
theorists argue that institutional form can provide solutions for political problems, “virtù 
theorists argue that no such fit is possible, that every politics has its remainders, that resistances 
are engendered by every settlement, even by those that are relatively enabling or empowering.”43  
White’s ethos can be placed on the side of a virtù theory as it refuses to accept that political 
questions have stable or final answers.  White admits that his ethos is “an initial disposition that 
may be legitimately deemphasized as a new claim or movement gains ground in political 
space.”44  Presumptive generosity does not intend to predict the correct course of behavior when 
confronted with difference, but merely hopes to restrain urges to demonize others.  This 
predisposition does not prevent groups that are antithetical to democracy to be opposed or 
excluded from democratic debate.  By denying the finality of politics, White’s ethos opens up 
political space for contestation and the actual practicing of politics, rather than foreclosing and 
displacing political activity.45 
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   In addition to addressing the five sites of practical wisdom that he identifies, I find that 
the true value of his theory is that it redefines the terrain of political theory in two significant 
ways.  First, by focusing on an ethos White places the burdens of democracy on its citizens 
rather than squarely on its institutions.  Second, this ethos requires rethinking the very notions of 
citizenship.  This process will inherently cause disruptions, but it also forces citizens to be 
political.  Instead of viewing politics as something that occurs “out there,” either at the voting 
booth, in Washington D.C., or state capitals, every citizen is responsible for politics.  Focusing 
on stopping these forms of oppression that fill in the “gaps” of juridical protections helps citizens 
to vivify democratic life. 
III: Questions of Method 
 While I find White’s ethos a beneficial resource for citizens in late-modernity, I believe 
that he does not provide an adequate method for citizens to cultivate such an ethos.  His focus is 
articulating the necessity and value of presumptive generosity.  Because of this focus, his project 
presupposes subjects that have already cultivated presumptive generosity, or at least that that 
they see the value of cultivating such an ethos.  He leaves the question of how to achieve such an 
ethos, especially for those who are most susceptible to transforming difference into Otherness, 
ambiguous.  My intent in this section is not to belittle White’s project, nor to suggest that it is 
utopian, but to contribute to this debate by working to refine his project.   
 While White does gesture towards a method, he does not believe that it can be a policy 
solution.  Instead, using immigration as an example, he argues that presumptive generosity, 
“would encourage more, and more varied, face-to-face engagements of American citizens with 
immigrants, in order to perhaps better grasp on an everyday level what animates as well as 
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threatens these people’s lives.”46  White suggests an actual physical confrontation with the other 
to force citizens to question their own notions of identity.  This would, in theory, expose 
privileged citizens who hold strong prejudices to the conditions of those that they would 
otherwise view as a dangerous Other.  Exposing citizens to radical difference can help to 
challenge their own deep seated prejudices. 
 However, this method still puts the cart before the horse.  Only those who already are 
sympathetic to White’s ethos would even engage in the project of relocation engagement.  There 
is a danger that many who hold strong prejudices are content to leave the other “over there.”  
They might simply embrace the toleration of “letting the other be,” while using it to veil their 
prejudices.  Furthermore, these citizens are precisely the ones that require the cultivation of this 
ethos to challenge their prejudices and engage in dialogues with different beings.  There is also a 
dangerous risk of this strategy achieving the opposite result.  Direct physical engagement without 
already adopting the ethos of presumptive generosity can turn sites of cooperation into sites of 
contestation and antagonism.  Connolly’s account of fundamentalism is important here.  He 
argues that fundamentalism results in refusing to question the “sources” of oneself and turning 
competing sources into something evil that must be defeated.47  He also warns that “all of us 
have strains of fundamentalism flowing through us.  And no component of cultural life 
automatically escapes colonization by fundamentalist impulses.”48  Without shifting one’s 
predispositions, face-to-face engagement with the other could leave these prejudices 
unchallenged or dangerously entrench fundamentalist urges to demonize them.   
 It should be noted that this criticism is not requesting a policy prescription or definite 
route that citizens should take to cultivate this ethos.  As argued, White’s aversion toward such 
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strategies is partly why I find his project so valuable.  Instead my criticism is that White does not 
provide enough tools for citizens to cultivate such an ethos.  My concern is that the magnitude of 
the temptation to transform the other into an enemy could make it difficult for citizens to 
cultivate an ethos of presumptive generosity without a clear method.  As long as it remains at the 
level of abstraction, citizens may not see the importance of such an ethos, instead viewing it as a 
purely theoretical project.  Citizens who see the value in such a project will lack the practical 
tools to cultivate these predispositions.  For White’s ethos to be more broadly realized, I believe 
that it requires the articulation of certain techniques and practices that can be used to help 
citizens cultivate an ethos of presumptive generosity.  Therefore, in Chapter 2, I will turn to 
Plato’s Alcibiades and its mandate of caring for oneself to describe the method of friendship and 
dialogue as a potential technique of a late-modern ethos. 
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Chapter 2: The Care of the Self in Plato’s Alcibiades—Reflection and Self Knowledge 
I find Stephen White’s account of a late-modern ethos of presumptive generosity, based 
on forbearance, restraint, and attunement, persuasive as a way to reframe citizenship as a 
response to the challenges that democracies now face.  I believe that focusing on a particular 
ethos, or spirit, of citizenship that can help citizens to rethink their assumptions towards others, 
including racial and sexual prejudices as well as moral stigmas associated with certain behaviors, 
can lead them to act in less oppressive and dominating ways.  However, while I find White’s 
account of this ethos intriguing, he under-specifies or assumes the cultivation of this 
ethos/citizen; he too easily links citizens to this ethos without demonstrating such a link.  That is, 
while White illustrates the advantages offered by this ethos, he leaves his reader unsure of the 
processes through which it can be made choate.  Despite his gestures towards such a method at 
the end of the book, arguing for “moving our more privileged selves to the places where the less 
privileged have their actual tables—in clubs, homes, or churches,” it remains unclear whether or 
not this move doesn’t already require the ethos he is describing.49  The act of relocation seems to 
already imply that citizens have changed their predispositions towards the other by moving out 
of the comfort of their homes, both literally and symbolically, and placed themselves in direct 
dialogue with the other.   
To address the problem of cultivating such an ethos, I turn towards ancient philosophy, a 
region neglected by White despite his reliance on the idea of an ethos.50  Specifically I turn to 
Plato’s Alcibiades and its focus on caring for the self as a necessary prerequisite for virtuous and 
just political action.  This turn towards Plato may seem problematic in attempting to articulate a 
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Sardo 23 
 
political strategy for late-modernity, because of his explicit linkage of politics and metaphysical 
speculation.51  However, the purpose of this paper is not to employ a Platonic political theory to 
address late-modernity, but rather to extract and translate his concept of the care of the self in the 
Alcibiades in order to augment the White’s late-modern ethos.52  Thus, my project aims to revise 
and adapt, not relocate, Platonic political theory. 
What can the Alcibiades contribute to this discussion?  I contend that the Alcibiades’s 
thesis of self-care is politically valuable for two reasons.  First, I argue that it can help to rethink 
political action; political actors are not immediately able to participate in politics virtuously, but 
require some work upon themselves.  In order to lead Athens, not only against its rivals, but to 
inculcate a sense of justice in her citizenry, Alcibiades must first cultivate justice within himself.  
In a late modern liberal democracy, the broadening of citizenship has made political activity, and 
therefore the obligations of caring for the self, universal.  Second, Socrates argues that in order to 
care for himself, Alcibiades must gain self-knowledge.  This must be understood in two senses.  
First, Alcibiades must correctly locate the self in order to care for it; as Socrates will argue, the 
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self is not one’s possessions or one’s body, but one’s soul.  Alcibiades must care for his soul.  
Second, and more importantly, self-knowledge requires habits of critical reflexivity, in which the 
subject turns back towards herself not only once, but as a process of continual transformation, an 
ethos.  Cultivating one’s self is itself a critical form of self-knowledge, in which the subject 
subjects herself to scrutiny and questioning.  This critical reflexivity is what I find valuable for 
our discussions of late-modernity, as it destabilizes stable notions of identity.  By subjecting the 
self to intense scrutiny, the subject is able to recognize the contingencies inherent in her being, 
allowing her to cultivate the ethos of presumptive generosity. 
However, this critical reflexivity must be further unpacked and treated delicately.  In 
order to achieve this level of self-knowledge, Socrates argues that Alcibiades must look at the 
soul through a mirror, and suggests that God is the purest and clearest mirror.  Julia Annas and 
David Johnson interpret this passage by arguing that in order to gain knowledge of oneself, one 
must gain knowledge of God, or the nature of reality.  While this reading is both internally and 
externally consistent, situating the Alcibiades within Plato’s middle dialogues, it myopically 
focuses on one passage, the mirror of God.  This focus ignores the ways throughout the dialogue 
that Socrates attempts to help Alcibiades care for himself.  I believe that a coherent reading of 
self-knowledge can be achieved both without relying on this passage and avoiding the 
metaphysical baggage of Annas’s and Johnson’s readings.  I argue that self-knowledge does not 
require a perfect mirror to cause subjects to care for themselves; an imperfect mirror will still 
provide an image of the self to reflect upon.  As such, the subject can use a multitude of 
mediums to engage in this reflection.  I will argue that friendship is a critical mirror that can be 
utilized in a late-modern context.  Engaging friends in a dialogue allows one to truly see oneself.  
However, this requires a true friendship; the friends must both be concerned in cultivating 
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themselves.  By engaging the self through this critical friendship, the subject is forced to 
question her preconceived notions of identity, allowing for a restrained attentiveness to 
difference. 
This paper will consist in four main sections.  The first will offer a close reading of 
Plato’s Alcibiades, with special emphasis placed on three areas: the care of the self as a necessity 
for virtuous political action, Plato’s concept of the self, and the relationship between self-care 
and self-knowledge.  This section will conclude by introducing the mirror analogy.  The second 
will examine the metaphysical readings of the mirror analogy offered by Annas and Johnson.  
The third will argue that these readings do not exhaust the possibilities for interpreting this 
dialogue, and will provide my alternative reading based on the reflexivity of the self achieved 
through friendship, rather than gaining knowledge of God.  The final section will conclude this 
chapter by both articulating the value of the care of the self for late-modern, and articulating 
what such care would look like in such a context. 
I: The Care of the Self in Plato’s Alcibiades 
 In the opening of the dialogue, Socrates confronts Alcibiades days before he plans to 
present himself to the Assembly.53  He begins by first praising Alcibiades for his beauty, his 
family’s prestige, and his wealth.54  Socrates further appeals to Alcibiades’s political ambitions, 
to have “your [Alcibiades’s] reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind.”55  This 
invocation is an ironic ploy by Socrates.   Socrates wants Alcibiades to care for himself, not his 
glory and power.  He is using Alcibiades’s own ambition to force him to care for himself and 
engage in a project of self-mastery.  When asked how he plans to advise the Athenians, or even 
upon what he shall advise them, Alcibiades fails to provide Socrates a satisfactory answer.  
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Socrates asks Alcibiades in what subjects has he greater knowledge than the Athenian assembly, 
and then argues that Alcibiades’s education failed to cover the business that concerned the 
Assembly.56  After lengthy dialogue, Alcibiades agrees that knowledge of justice is required for 
advising the Athenians.57   
 The dialogue has already made several important points.  First, there is a special 
knowledge or skill that is necessary for political activity.  Alcibiades must learn justice before he 
can practice politics virtuously and effectively.  Alcibiades must have mastery of his own 
passions in order to use his political power virtuously and justly.  This means that politics 
inherently requires some work by political actors; no one is a readymade political actor.  Second, 
this opening passage is an indictment of Athenian pedagogy.  Despite Alcibiades’s wealth and 
prestige, he still lacks necessary political knowledge.58  Socrates extends this criticism later in 
the dialogue to the entirety of Athens’s political system, arguing that Alcibiades is “not alone in 
this sad state—you’ve got most of our city’s politicians for company.”59  From these two reasons 
alone, a justification for the care of the self can be found.  Because politics requires knowledge 
of justice, and because the Athenian pedagogical system fails to impart such knowledge, it 
requires work on the part of the subject to gain such knowledge.  Furthermore, as Pericles states, 
all citizens must be concerned and take part in politics, and “we are unique in considering the 
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man who take no part in these to be not apolitical but useless.”60  Contemporary politics, with the 
universalization of suffrage, again takes this form, as all citizens are political actors. 
 Socrates is also making another important point in the opening of the dialogue.  Socrates 
states that he “was the first man to fall in love with you, son of Clinias, and now that the others 
have stopped pursuing you I suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given 
up.”61  Prefiguring later gestures in the dialogue, Socrates is shifting the focus towards 
Alcibiades’s soul.  While his other suitors have left him now that he has grown and aged, 
Socrates remains attracted to Alcibiades.  Socrates is in love with what Socrates is, not what he 
has.  Furthermore, Socrates also is describing the type of relationship that Alcibiades needs in 
order to care for himself, and gain knowledge of justice.  “I hope to exert great influence over 
you by showing you that I’m worth the world to you and that nobody is capable of providing you 
with the influence you crave…except me.”62  Alcibiades needs more than just an erotic 
relationship, but a relationship that is focused on improving him.  Socrates believes that only 
through his friendship can Alcibiades gain knowledge of justice. 
 Alcibiades continues the dialogue attempting to argue that he does in fact have 
knowledge of justice.  However, Alcibiades is again unable to provide a coherent account of his 
knowledge of justice, causing Socrates to conclude that this is because he has neither learned it 
from a teacher nor discovered it himself, and therefore has no knowledge of justice.63  Alcibiades 
counters, allowing Plato to make another critique of Athenian politics, by offering a false 
dichotomy, arguing that “the Athenians and the other Greeks rarely discuss which course is more 
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just or unjust….they skip over it and ask which one would be advantageous to do.”64  However, 
by demonstrating that those who do admirable things gain advantages and that just people 
conduct themselves admirably, Socrates argues that the just is advantageous.65  After Alcibiades 
admits to Socrates that he has never seen his opinion waver so much, Socrates concludes that 
Alcibiades is suffering from twofold ignorance. 66  Socrates chastises Alcibiades arguing “it’s 
obvious from what we’ve said that not only are you ignorant about the most important things, but 
you also think you know what you don’t know.”67  This twofold ignorance indicates that 
Alcibiades’s lack of political knowledge is much more pervasive than initially known; 
Alcibiades not only lacks knowledge of justice, but also lacks knowledge of himself.  Here the 
dialogue’s focus shifts.  In order to gain knowledge justice, and with it a sense of self-mastery, 
one must know oneself; to order the soul and subdue the passions, one must know oneself. 
 Self-knowledge is intrinsically linked to the notion of care.  First, it is the foremost 
requirement for caring for the self.  As Socrates states, “I’m afraid we often think were 
cultivating ourselves when we’re not.”68  In order to properly care for himself, Alcibiades must 
correctly identify the self.  Additionally, Socrates is not focused on defining Alcibiades’s 
particular self, but what the self is in itself.69  Socrates begins this investigation by first 
differentiating things that belong to the self and the self itself, between things that the self does 
and things the self is.  “When you’re cultivating what belongs to you, you’re not cultivating 
yourself.”70  While this point may seem simple and unnecessary, Plato’s point is political.  
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Caring for the self doesn’t involve gathering riches or glory, but is a focus purely of the self on 
the self.71  As Socrates states, one wouldn’t care for the soul in the same way that one would care 
for one’s shoes or one’s body.72  However, in each case, one requires the help of a master: a 
cobbler for shoes, a doctor for the body, and a friend for the soul.   
 Socrates continues the dialogue by drawing another obvious distinction: between a 
craftsman and his tools.73  He extends this analogy to the question of the self.  Just as a lyre 
player is distinct from the lyre, Socrates argues that that which uses the body is also distinct from 
the body.74  Socrates is arguing that the self must be distinct from the body.  The self is that 
which uses the body, which Socrates identifies as the soul.75  However, the soul that Socrates is 
proposing is neither an immaterial substance nor a transcendent being.  The soul is that which 
rules the body, and is therefore the agent of embodied action rather than a subsistent being.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the immortal soul of the Phaedo or the tripartite soul of the Republic and 
the Phaedrus.76  Socrates is pointing to something that is distinct from the body, but not to some 
substance.  He is arguing that the soul should be conceived as an embodied agent of action.  
Gregory Vlastos also distinguishes two different conceptions of the soul in Plato’s philosophy, 
writing that “For SocratesE our soul is our self…It is the ‘I’ of psychological function and moral 
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imputation—the ‘I’ in ‘I feel, I think, I know, I choose, I act.’”77  The self that Alcibiades must 
care for is the ethical subject of action, not a metaphysical substance. 
This problematization of the self has its own political implications.  Alcibiades must gain 
knowledge of himself in order to care for himself, but this knowledge is not knowledge of a 
substance.  Instead this knowledge is of the ethical subject of action.  Alcibiades must gain 
knowledge of his strengths and weaknesses, his virtues and vices, his passions and his relishes.  
All of these play into this conception of the soul.  Furthermore all of these are subject to change.  
In caring for himself, Alcibiades must also create a stable character that is able to subdue both 
existing and new passions.  Alcibiades must cultivate the rational and restraining drives to 
dominate his drives for pleasure and domination.  By forcing the subject to reflect back on 
herself, self-knowledge itself is beneficial for ethical actions.  Only when Alcibiades knows his 
passions and weaknesses can he be on guard against them; if he has no knowledge of his 
temptations then he will be unable to resist them.   
Having now determined what the self as the object of care is, Socrates begins to argue 
what caring for the self entails.  He begins by defining care as a skill that makes something 
better.78  Caring for the self is a practice that will improve the self.  Therefore, caring for the self 
must be differentiated from practices that both focus on one’s possessions or one’s body.  
Gaining wealth and prestige is not caring for the self, as it concerns one’s positions.  Healthy 
practices similarly care for the body and not the self.  Instead caring for the self must consist in 
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practices that improve the self.  At this point Alcibiades begins to grow frustrated with Socrates, 
demanding “try to explain how exactly we should cultivate ourselves.”79  Socrates responds that 
by correctly identifying the self they have already begun moving in this direction, and that “the 
next step is that we have to cultivate our soul and look to that.”80  
At this point the dialogue shifts to a provoking and difficult to interpret passage.  Socrates 
frustrates both Alcibiades and the reader by not clearly defining what he means when he says 
that Alcibiades must cultivate himself.  Instead, he begins a cryptic analogy comparing self-
knowledge, and as I will argue caring for the self, to a mirror.  Gesturing towards the famous 
inscription at Delphi, “Know Thyself,” Socrates argues that the best way to know oneself is to 
use something “that allows us to see both it and ourselves when we look at it.”81  In order to truly 
gain self-knowledge one requires a mirror; Alcibiades needs something to “reflect” himself 
against in order to truly know and care for himself.  Socrates argues that humans can look into 
the eye of another person and are able to see both the other and the reflection of themselves.82  
Socrates draws the analogy to the soul.  Just as humans can look into another’s eye to see 
themselves, “if the soul, Alcibiades, is to know itself, it must look a soul, and especially at that 
region in which what makes a soul good, wisdom, occurs.”83  However, Socrates leaves this 
analogy ambiguous.  The next section examines a reading of this analogy through the lens of a 
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Platonic, or Neo-Platonic, lens.  In order to gain the truest knowledge of himself Alcibiades must 
look to God, as only such knowledge of God will Alcibiades know the true nature of himself. 
II: The Mirror of God—A Metaphysical Reading of Self-Knowledge 
  
 Julia Annas provides a reading of self-knowledge that begins similarly to the reading I’ve 
offered above.  She argues that self-knowledge is not a type of psychological reflection, but is 
“knowing myself in the sense of knowing my place in society, knowing who I am and where I 
stand in relation to others.”84  For Annas, self-knowledge is necessary for sōphrosunē, or self 
control; knowledge of one’s relationships with others is critical for ethical conduct.  She argues 
that this self-knowledge is a prerequisite for justice, especially in a Platonic sense of both 
psychic and political harmony.  One must know one’s place in the social order to perform one’s 
function well.85  In this conception of self-knowledge, correctly locating oneself within a social 
order, Annas allows space for the reading of care as an active process of questioning one’s 
inherited social norms, practices, and ideas.  To know the self is to know how the self is shaped 
through power, knowledge, language, and one’s own relationships.  This knowledge is crucial to 
my reading of care, as knowledge of the power relationships in which the subject finds herself in 
allows the subject to critique and problematize these relationships in.  
 However, Annas pushes self-knowledge further, basing this interpretation on the 
following passage: 
Socrates: Just as mirrors are clearer, purer, and brighter than the reflecting surface 
of the eye, isn’t God both purer and brighter than the best part of our soul? 
Alcibiades: I would certainly think so, Socrates. 
                                                 
84
 Julia Annas, “Self-Knowledge in Early Plato,” in Platonic Investigations, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press), 111-138., 121. 
85
 Ibid. 123.  For Plato’s conception of Justice see Plato, Republic, 433a-b. 
Sardo 33 
 
Socrates: So the way that we can best see and know ourselves is to use the finest 
mirror available and look at God and, on the human level, at the virtue of the 
soul?86 
 
This passage suggests that to truly know and care for ourselves individuals must compare their 
souls to that of God or reality as a whole.87  Annas writes, “He[Plato] takes self-knowledge to 
involve not just social facts, but at the deepest level, facts about objective reality as a 
whole…self-knowledge is knowledge of how one stands among others, and thus involve a true 
conception of the world in which one lives.”88  David Johnson makes a similar argument.  
According to Johnson, Socrates argues that using God as a mirror for the soul allows the rational 
part of the soul to avoid the distractions of the passions and thus gain a true knowledge of 
itself.89  This reading equates the rational part of the soul with the divine, suggesting that Plato 
may be pointing towards the divided soul of the middle dialogues.  A further implication of this 
reading is that the nature of the “true self” shifts from the agent behind action to a metaphysical 
entity.  Johnson argues that the true self is God: “This intellect…what Alcibiades was finally to 
see, to love, and to identify with was the pure unadulterated mind that is God.”90  To know 
oneself is to know God. 
 This reading of the mirror analogy has deep roots in the Neo-Platonic tradition.  The Neo-
Platonic philosopher Proclus’s commentary of the Alcibiades depicts care for the self as a 
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method to transcend the physical world.91  He argues that self-knowledge is the critical initial 
step to such transcendence, as “the beginnings of perfection depend on the consideration of 
ourselves.”92 Similar to other Neo-Platonists, Proclus argues that the body corrupts the soul and 
“obstruct[s] the contemplation of the realities.”93 Furthermore, Proclus appeals to the Platonic 
concept of anamnesis.  He argues that the soul’s incarnation is the root cause of Alcibiades’s 
twofold ignorance.  Following this reading, Alcibiades’s failure to recognize his lack of political 
knowledge is not caused by a failure of pedagogy, but is a result of the nature of human souls.  
“Although souls descend to birth filled essentially with knowledge, yet as a result of birth, they 
contract forgetfulness… for this reason they acquire twofold ignorance, under the impression 
that through such notions they possess knowledge, but really in a state of ignorance on account 
of their forgetfulness.”94   Caring for the self allows Alcibiades to reclaim the perfect knowledge 
that his soul possessed before birth.95   
While not committing themselves to such a Neo-Platonic theory of anamnesis, Annas and 
Johnson still provide readings that are intended to square the dialogue with mature Platonic 
metaphysics.  In both cases caring for the self involves gaining knowledge of a transcendent 
reality, whether it is God or nature as a whole.  To know oneself is to know where one fits in the 
order of nature, to know one’s place in the universe.  This reading of the mirror analogy is 
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valuable, as it shifts the focus away from an idea of the self-knowledge from a type of 
psychological introspection, to knowing what the self truly is.  The dialogue supports this move 
as Socrates states, “we should first consider what ‘itself’ is, in itself.  But in fact, we’ve only 
been considering what an individual self is, instead of what ‘itself’ is.”96  Socrates believes that 
in order to care for himself, Alcibiades must know the nature of the self, not merely his own 
individuality.  This involves a sort of metaphysical speculation in order to discover this true 
nature of the self.  However, I find this reading inadequate, while internally consistent.  Annas 
and Johnson both focus almost exclusively on the mirror of God passage.  This allows them to 
articulate a reading of the Alcibiades that is consistent with the metaphysical moves of Plato’s 
middle dialogues.  While this move may be justified based on the text of the dialogue, it is not 
the only way to read this passage. 
This reading of self-knowledge creates a reading of caring for the self as transformation 
through contemplation.  Alcibiades must compare his own soul to the divine perfection of God.  
This act of comparison can be seen as a transformative experience.  Once Alcibiades gains true 
knowledge of himself, he can gain knowledge of the true form of justice.    This knowledge 
allows him, returning from the transcendent reality of God to the polis to lead and govern 
effectively.  The knowledge of perfect justice allows Alcibiades to impart justice to his subjects, 
as in the Platonic conception only those who have virtue can teach it to others.  This reading 
clearly situates the Alcibiades within the thought of the middle dialogues.   There is some 
justification for their reading elsewhere in the dialogue.  In the “Royal Logos,” Socrates points to 
the four virtues of the soul that are present in the Republic: wisdom, temperance, courage, and 
justice.97  Furthermore, Socrates also describes a part of the soul as “that region in it resembles 
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the divine, and someone who looked at that and grasped everything divine...would have the best 
grasp of himself as well.”98  In these passages Plato seems to be gesturing towards his more 
complex metaphysics that he develops in the middle period.   
However, I believe that there are several aspects of the Alcibiades that cannot be 
subsumed into the philosophy of the middle dialogues, opening up space for an alternative 
reading.99  The first is the stark contrast between the soul of the Alcibiades and the soul of the 
middle dialogues.  As argued earlier, this soul is simply the ‘I’ or subject behind an action rather 
than a substance.  This positions the dialogue more closely with the early Socratic dialogues.  
Furthermore, Socrates never appeals to the doctrine of the Forms in the Alcibiades.  While 
Socrates does ask Alcibiades what justice is and what the self is, he is asking what Alcibiades’s 
own thoughts are to convince him to care for himself.  Socrates never appeals to transcendent 
entities to solve these problems, instead focusing on Alcibiades’s own account.100  Finally, the 
political theory offered in the Alcibiades differs from the political theory of the middle dialogues.  
In these, Plato’s need for epistemological certainty extends to the ethical questions of 
Socrates.101  Justice is no longer an act of knowing the self and the self’s relation to her world, 
but instead requires knowledge of the Form of justice.  Similarly, while Plato maintains a focus 
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on the self in his later philosophy, the focus shifts to the self transcending the sensible world. 102  
Politically, the middle and late dialogues shift towards an institutional focus.  While still 
focusing on caring for the self, Plato shifts the subject of care from the self to the polis—
focusing on pedagogy and structure in the Republic and laws and institutions in the Laws.103  
These shifts can be viewed as a result of Plato’s view that Socratic politics were a failure.  There 
is a continual risk in democracies of individuals failing to care for themselves.  Without every 
citizen having a Socrates to mentor them, forcing them to focus on and care for themselves, how 
can the citizenry effectively practice politics?  Therefore, instead of using philosophy to prepare 
for political activity, Plato argues that philosophers should direct political activity.104 
III: The Mirror of Friends—A Non-Metaphysical Reading of Self-Knowledge 
 The readings offered by both Annas and Johnson are both internally consistent and 
correspond the mature Plato in the middle dialogues.  However, I believe that there is space for 
an alternative reading for two reasons.  The first, as argued above, is that there are several 
aspects of the dialogue that cannot easily be incorporated into Plato’s mature system, in fact 
resembling his earlier Socratic dialogues.  The second is that the passage itself leaves such space.  
As Socrates states, “the way that we can best see and know ourselves is to use the finest mirror 
available and look at God and, on the human level, at the virtue of the soul?”105  The most 
perfect way to gain self-knowledge would be to look towards God.  However, if this is not 
possible, it is necessary to look to the human soul.  While this may be an imperfect knowledge, it 
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still allows Alcibiades to know and care for himself.  Alcibiades must look to another soul in 
order to see himself.  Socrates plays on the double meaning of pupil, arguing “when a man looks 
into an eye his face appears in it, like in a mirror.  We call this the ‘pupil’, for it’s a sort of 
miniature of the man.”106  Looking into another’s eye, one sees a reflection of herself as a pupil; 
in our friends we see reflections of ourselves.  In order to gain a true knowledge of oneself, one 
must engage in honest dialogue with true friends. 
 A certain type of friendship is required, however, to serve as a mirror for the self.  
Socrates began making this point at the outset of the dialogue in his criticism of the suitors that 
only pursued Alcibiades for his beauty, prestige, and wealth.107  These “friends” were only 
interested in Alcibiades for what he has— his wealth, fame, and body— not what Alcibiades is; 
they cannot possibly show a reflection of Alcibiades back to himself.  This is because their 
friendship with Alcibiades is purely that of self-interest, not through a love of Alcibiades.  They 
will not criticize and force Alcibiades to reflect back on himself, but will flatter him in order to 
partake in his possessions.  This prefigures Aristotle’s concept of perfect friendship, which he 
describes as “that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue.  For these friends 
wish alike for one another’s good because they are good men.”108  Socrates truly loves 
Alcibiades and wants to improve him, through harsh criticism if necessary.  Only in this way will 
the friend act as a mirror and a site of self-reflection. 
The entire Socratic project can be conceived of in this way.   Using this reading of the 
mirror analogy allows the elenchus to be deployed.  The dialogue itself is a method to care for 
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the self.109  Throughout the dialogue Socrates engages Alcibiades in questioning and critique, 
forcing Alcibiades to question the knowledge that he believed to have.  This form extends 
throughout the dialogues, “Socrates harassed his interlocutors with questions which put 
themselves into question, forcing them to pay attention to and take care of themselves.”110  
Alcibiades must deploy the Socratic elenchus against himself by continuing the dialogue with 
Socrates and with others.  This internal dialogue is a crucial element of caring for oneself as it 
creates a critical distance with the self.  Friendship creates a second self that is worked on by the 
self, despite being the same entity that is the subject of such action.  The self as the object of care 
becomes something that the self can work upon, cultivate, improve, and transform.  Under this 
analysis, self-knowledge is no longer based on a relationship to some metaphysical principle or 
truth, but instead is understood as a certain type of relationship to the self.   
Following this line of reasoning, self-knowledge must be conceived of in two ways.  In 
the first, self-knowledge exists in a weak sense.  In order to care for himself, Alcibiades must 
correctly locate the self.  This is Socrates’s purpose in defining the self as the soul that controls 
the body.  In the second, self-knowledge is an active process of caring for the self.  Here self-
knowledge implies not a state of consciousness, but an active process of engaging the self in 
Socratic questioning.  This conception of self-knowledge conceives of the subject as both the 
subject and object of care.  My reading of the Socrates’s mirror analogy turns on this point.  We 
are to gain self-knowledge by looking reflexively to the self through the mirror of friends.111  .  
Therefore, when Socrates says that the soul must look at another soul, one must treat these two 
                                                 
109
 Nehamas extends this point beyond the interlocutors, arguing that the true irony of the dialogues is that we as 
readers take Socrates’s side against his interlocutors, but are forced to examine ourselves. The purpose of the 
dialogue is to have the reader is to examine his or her own belief set and make sure that it is consistent.  Alexander 
Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1998), 41-42.  
110Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, 
trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1995), 89. Original emphasis. 
111Plato, Alcibiades, 132b-133c. 
Sardo 40 
 
souls as the same.112  I believe that this move is justified because of the extensive rhetorical use 
of mirrors and reflection throughout the dialogue.113  When one is using a mirror, what is 
importance isn’t the surface of the mirror, but the image that is reflected.  Alcibiades must 
represent himself in some way to critique and judge himself.  Friendship provides a potential site 
of reflection, allowing both friends to cultivate herself   
This knowledge of the self is critical for subjects to cultivate themselves, which is the 
purpose of self-knowledge.  Socrates argues that if Alcibiades has no knowledge of himself he 
has no knowledge of his belongings, or his belongings’ belongings.114  I read this passage not 
merely to imply that knowledge of the self allows one to know her body and possessions, but 
also passions, vices, and virtues.  It is only through this knowledge that one can cultivate virtue.  
This problematiziation of the self allows the self to treat oneself as site of activity and action.  
This interpretation of the self allows the self to work on the self and cultivate ourselves.  As 
Charles Taylor writes, “To stand back from ourselves and our existing ‘relish’…allows us the 
possibility to remake ourselves …We are creatures of ultimately contingent connections: we 
have formed certain habits.  But we can break from them and re-form them.”115 
There are two reasons why I believe that this reason is to be preferred to the readings 
offered by Julia Annas and Mark Johnson.  The first is that it can stand alone without recourse to 
the metaphysics of the middle dialogues.  Their readings myopically focus on the singular 
reference to the mirror of God in the dialogue in order to read the dialogue as more Platonic.  
However, in doing so they have ignored the mirror that Socrates is providing for Alcibiades 
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throughout the entire dialogue: himself.  This allows the care of the self to more smoothly be 
extracted from its context without metaphysical baggage.  The second reason builds precisely on 
the first: it is not reliant on Platonic metaphysics, it can be deployed in a late modern context.  
Using friends to care for oneself allows the subject to gain knowledge of her social location and 
of the networks of power that she finds herself in, as well as the relationship between herself and 
these forces.  Such a dialogical process of caring for oneself can in turn disrupt these power 
relationships, by creating space for subjects to question these relationships. 
Again I find Bonnie Honig’s distinction between virtù and virtue theories useful in 
articulating self-cultivation.  She writes, “It is for the sake of those perpetually generated 
remainders of politics that virtù theorists seek to secure the perpetuity of political contest.”116  
The care of the self should be understood as a virtù theory.  I make this claim not only because of 
the aporia that plagues the Socratic dialogues but also because of the function of self-knowledge.  
Alcibiades, at the beginning of the dialogue, has his mind made up about his ideas concerning 
politics, justice, and himself.  Socrates disrupts this knowledge by commanding Alcibiades to 
care for himself.  By utilizing the elenchus as a practice of care itself, self-knowledge contests 
stable political knowledge.  This exposes how common conceptions of virtue and justice are 
inherently incomplete.117  These, and other answers to political questions, always carry 
unintended consequences and remainders will always exist. For this reason, this theory is both 
theoretically and historically politically subversive.118  Socrates was tried for both corrupting the 
youth and appearing to make the weaker argument the stronger.  While the political nature of the 
first is obvious, especially when viewed in relation to his relationship with Alcibiades, the 
second is also decisively political.  Socrates’ methodology forced individuals to examine 
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themselves, unsettling their previously held opinions, weakening their previous claims to 
knowledge.   
IV: The Ethos of Care—The Care of the Self in Late-Modernity  
Having provided an alternative reading of self-knowledge in the Alcibiades it remains for 
this activity to be translated in order to address late-modern concerns.  This requires three steps.  
First, it must be demonstrated that this technique can be extracted from its Platonic context and 
applied to late-modernity, by arguing that my reading can be situated in what White frames as 
weak ontological terms.  Second, these techniques must be clearly articulated.  Late modern 
subjectivity differs in fundamental ways from its ancient counterpart; it is hard to imagine the 
hard drinking of the Symposium, for example, as democracy in action.  Not all of Socrates’ 
methods can be perfectly translated into a contemporary context.  Finally, I must articulate what 
the care of the self contributes to White’s discussion of a late-modern ethos.  
My reading of self-knowledge, a model of self-reflection without the metaphysical 
baggage of the Plato, can easily be articulated within White’s weak ontological framework.  
Gaining critical self-knowledge through dialogue with friends problematizes stable notions of 
identity.  Self-reflection, putting the self itself into question, allows the subject to recognize the 
contingencies inherent in her own being.  What she originally took to be her identity now 
becomes the play of difference.  She must therefore remain attuned to herself in order to continue 
developing this ethos of presumptive generosity.  The subject is able to recognize that “identity is 
thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable 
to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions 
applied to them.”119  As Connolly notes, however, this play of identities always carries implicit 
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relations of power, and the potential for oppression and domination.120  Therefore, the 
recognition of the contingency of difference is critical to tempering this temptation view peoples 
that are different as Others that must be dominated. This recognition of difference is critical to 
develop the presumptive generosity that White argues for.  The reflexive self-knowledge 
involved in caring for the self shifts the predispositions of the subject towards the other.  By 
extending the same respect for difference within her own identity towards the other, she resists 
the slide from difference, to otherness, to evil Other. 
Furthermore, the care of the self can be seen as an aesthetic cultivation of one’s identity.  
Following Foucault’s appropriation, self-cultivation, conceived as an aesthetic process, creates 
space within power relationships where subjects can express agency, though not autonomy.121  
Foucault believed that these techniques could allow marginalized groups to create different types 
of modes of being within normalizing power relations.122  Subjects should cultivate values and 
desires that they find aesthetically valuable for themselves, instead of those determined by 
normalizing pressures.  However, Foucault does not believe this to be a project of liberation.  
Having rejected the idea of a Teflon subject, complete autonomy is impossible for the stickier 
subjects of late modernity.  Caring for the self does not transcend power/knowledge 
relationships, as there is no pre-political state of nature to which the subject can return.  “Thus 
the freedom we attain in ethical conduct is not a liberation of a true self from all social 
influences, but rather an ability to modify ourselves in the context of the social influences at 
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work on us.”123  By turning the disciplinary techniques of modernity towards the self, subjects 
can reformulate the power relations in which they find themselves bound.  Treating the self as a 
work of art allows subjects to cultivate this ethos of presumptive generosity towards the other.  
As Rorty makes similar gestures arguing for a new sense of solidarity “thought of as the ability 
to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation—the ability to 
think of people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us.’”124   Because her 
identity is contingent, she is not bound to react negatively towards the other, but work to 
emphasize the attentiveness and restraint required for this ethos.125 
 What would a late-modern care of the self look like?  As argued in the previous section, 
caring for oneself requires using friendship as a mirror to reflect back on oneself.  One route 
involves a literal appropriation, in which one uses the relationships that one already has formed 
in order to care for oneself.  She works to improve herself and improve her friends.  However, 
another more radical route, ironically opened up by the universalization of political action, can 
be found in participatory democracy.  The combination of universal suffrage and globalization 
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has opened the sites of interaction between citizens.  As all citizens are political actors, they are 
thrown into cites where they must confront the other.  These sites of interaction, be they jury 
panels, public schools, city councils, or voting booths, bring individuals into direct contact.  This 
contact can serve as the mirror that Socrates requires.  The other is the mirror that the self uses to 
reflect back on herself.  The difference of the other problematizes any static views of identity 
that the subject may hold.  This forces her to reflect back on herself and recognize the 
contingency of her own identity.   
Thus friends, enemies, and strangers all serve as potential mirrors for late-modern 
subjects.  This is similar to White’s suggestion towards the end of his book.  His project aims “at 
cultivating a sensibility that sees individuals, families, and ways of life, not collective types.”126  
White wants his late-modern citizens to associate the other with lives and faces rather than 
preconceived stereotypes and identities.  Self-care works towards a similar but distinct end.  In 
both cases, the subject is trying to cultivate a disposition of presumptive generosity.  However, 
my focus is less on individualizing the other, but using the other to force the subject back 
towards herself.  By using the other as a mirror, the subject can engage in a dialogue with both 
herself and the other, allowing her to cultivate the tolerance and restraint necessary to address the 
problems of late-modernity. 
 There is, however, a paradox facing the care of the self in late-modernity.  As noted, the 
space for interaction and dialogue required for this care of the self that is opened by liberal 
democracy carries its own dangers of apathy and indifference.  While the care of the self can 
help address problems of discrimination and stigmatization that plague the late-modern 
democracy, it still requires citizens to take it upon themselves to cultivate this ethos.  It requires 
that citizens use the spaces of interaction to reflect back on their own notions of identity rather 
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than simply falling back on their own prejudices.  Even more fundamentally, it requires that 
citizens seek out these sites of contestation and dialogue instead of remaining apolitical.  
However, our liberal sensibilities preclude us from suggesting that citizens should be forced to 
interact with their fellow human beings.  The sphere of protection that liberalism has fashioned 
around the individual renders intolerable the idea of “forcing them to be free.”  This should not 
be seen as a damming impasse to my project; my purpose isn’t to recommend policy but to 
demonstrate the value of the care of the self for a late-modern citizenry.  One cannot force 
citizens to care for themselves, but only suggest avenues and gesture towards new approaches to 
these problems.  These gestures, tensions, and challenges mandate a further investigation of self-
cultivation in late-modernity, and I turn to such a project in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Self-Cultivation in Late-Modernity—Dialogue and Receptivity 
Chapter 1 identified both the strengths and weaknesses of Stephen White’s project in The 
Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen.  His approach is valuable for shifting the focus of political 
activity away from purely institutional questions to the practices that citizens must undertake to 
vivify and fulfill the promise of these institutions.  However, while he clearly and effectively 
articulates the value of cultivating an ethos of presumptive generosity, he unsatisfactorily 
expresses a method for developing this ethos.  Chapter 2 attempted to support White’s theory by 
looking to Plato’s Alcibiades and its requirement of caring for oneself before engaging in 
political activity.  The dialogue also articulated a method for caring for oneself: it proposes using 
a mirror, either of God or of another human soul, to gain self-knowledge.  The mirror is valuable 
because it allows the subject to see both herself (the reflection) and the other (the mirror itself).  I 
argued that this practice can be a valuable way to cultivate the ethos that White describes, as it 
allows the subject to use the other in order to challenge her own conceptions of identity.  By 
challenging her own ideas of herself, she can become more hospitable when confronted by 
difference.  
 This chapter will attempt to bridge those chapters, attempting to argue how self-
cultivation as understood in the Alcibiades can be used in a late-modern democracy to develop 
an ethos of presumptive generosity that White defends.  This project requires considerable 
unpacking and explicating, as late-modern citizens do not enjoy the benefit of their own Socrates 
who can interrogate them and force them to care for themselves.  Instead of relying on the gadfly 
of Socrates, citizens must find their own mirrors who can force them to reflect back upon 
themselves.  This requires citizens to engage in dialogues, both with those close to them who 
share their identity claims, and with those whom they would find different or foreign.  This 
Sardo 48 
 
second type of dialogue, engagement of difference, is critical for self-cultivation; difference 
becomes a mirror that allows citizens to reflect back on how their own identity is constituted by 
difference, and how portions of their identity cut through and across difference.  However, such 
dialogues present problems for political action; in political debates and dialogues winning 
matters.  In these situations, such as elections, legislative votes, or court decisions, wins and 
losses can be tantamount to life and death, placing enormous pressure on parties to compete 
against different groups rather than to cultivate a respect for them.  Several theorists have 
espoused models of deliberative democracy, in which the democratic legitimacy requires 
participation by those affected by the action being deliberated upon.127  This model attempts to 
broaden the space of political decision-making to groups that normally would be excluded, but 
has been criticized for ignoring the problems of identity and difference.128  These tensions 
suggest an inherent problem in articulating a care of the self for late-modern democratic citizens.  
 These tensions also suggest that self-cultivation must take place in spheres outside of 
politics as normally understood.  This is suggested in the Alcibiades itself, as Socrates instructs 
Alcibiades that he must care for his soul before he advises the city on matters of politics.  Here, I 
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find Romand Coles’s arguments for a dialogical ethics valuable: such an ethic attempts to engage 
a discursive exchange across and through the intersections between the various dichotomies that 
are created in contemporary political discourse, attempting to challenge the nature of these 
“edges.”129  He argues for an ethos that engages these edges in political discourse that allows for 
the proliferation of difference and the cultivation of an ethos of respect for such difference.  He 
writes, “The position I am proposing seeks to affirm difference without falling into indifferent 
relativism, and maintain a general ethical position without falling into the trap of totalizing 
reason.”130  To engender this dialogue, Coles focuses on receptivity and listening, which in 
contrast to deliberative models is intended not to passively appreciate difference, but engaging 
the other in a way that the other into expressing herself in an attempt to presence difference.  
“Listening, therefore, is an art cultivated through the active negotiation of discrepant points in a 
constellation of agonistic concerns…critical interventions that aim to bring one’s own 
perspectives into play with the others while attentively listening to their responses.”131  This 
model is also extremely receptive of the mirror analogy.  By engaging the other receptively, one 
can use the other passively as a way to reflect back on oneself.  The focus on receptivity allows 
the subject to appreciate the other as a mirror rather than try to convert or dominate her. 
 This chapter will use Coles’s theory of receptivity as a springboard for describing the 
practices of caring for the self in late-modernity.  I will argue that citizens, to care for themselves 
and cultivate an ethos of presumptive generosity, must actively engage in dialogue with those 
who would be regarded as “different,” but must do so in a receptive manner focusing on an 
appreciation for difference rather than focusing on building consensus.  These dialogues can take 
a myriad of forms, from service learning and volunteering with inner city youth, to attending 
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artistic events of different and foreign cultures.  These engagements allow citizens to reflect back 
upon their own static conceptions of identity while also gaining greater exposure to difference, 
thus problematizing self/other dichotomies that plague democratic politics.  This chapter will be 
divided into two main sections.  The first will expound Coles’s theory of receptivity and attempt 
to provide various models of dialogue that can be used for self-cultivation.  The second will 
argue that these engagements can function both as Socratic mirrors and can cultivate White’s 
ethos of presumptive generosity. 
I: Receptivity and Dialogue 
Romand Coles attempts to frame a response to democratic challenges that moves beyond 
both the liberalism/communitarianism and agonism/rationalism debates.132  Arguing that such 
responses make the mistake of conceiving of identity claims as static or unproblematic, Coles 
attempts to sketch an ethos which embraces tensions in identity claims and “the dialogical 
interworld of differences to which they belong.”133  Coles’s ethos is intended to foster dialogues 
between difference that can ground democratic action by being more attuned to the play of 
identity\difference, which should be understood as existing both within individuals and societies.  
While the idea of a dialogue may suggest a theoretical proximity to deliberative democrats, I will 
demonstrate in the following exegesis two key differences, which are critical both for Coles’s 
project as well as instilling self-cultivation.  The first difference is that Coles’s dialogical ethos is 
structured outside of formal decision making processes, and exists entirely in the “public 
sphere.”  While his model organization, the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), is in a broad 
sense an interest group, its focus is not on a particular political issue, but rather on fostering a 
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culture “of vibrant participatory and pluralizing democratic practices.”134  Secondly, instead of 
focusing on persuasion and consensus building, Coles focuses on receptivity and listening.  This 
contrasting approach intends on actively presencing difference in others.  I will argue that this 
notion of receptivity is a superior way to unpack the mirror analogy of the Alcibiades into 
contemporary democratic practice. 
 Coles’s theory of receptivity attempts to shift the terms of political engagement.  Similar 
to White, he argues for reconceiving politics on both a theoretical and practical level, arguing 
that most accounts of political activity work to preserve the status quo rather than contribute to 
more “radical reformations of democratic theory itself.”135  Coles, like White, wants to avoid 
totalizing theories and is skeptical of waiting for a “democracy to come.”  His project focuses on 
the roles of individual citizens, arguing that “democratic theory ought to develop 
significantly…in dialogical and more receptive encounters with democratic struggles in ways 
that might allow emerging practices and purposes of democratic associational life to call into 
question and possibly alter our core assumptions.”136  Coles wants to facilitate critical dialogues 
with the other; these are intended not to find an issue or value that can be used for coalition-
building, but to transform subjects.  He hopes that subjects engaging the other in spheres outside 
of traditional political venues can disturb their presuppositions concerning themselves and 
others.  By moving these dialogues out of formal political deliberations, Coles hopes that citizens 
are less likely to succumb to the temptation to essentialize others for their own political purposes.  
Using Saul Alinksy’s IAF as a model, Coles explicates his theory in practical terms.  He states 
that the IAF “draws together strong and enduring coalitions of poor and middle-class people 
across lines of race, ethnicity, religion, and neighborhood to address poverty, housing, education, 
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public infrastructure, environmental justice, and many other issues.”137   Coles views the IAF as 
a valuable model because of its emphasis on relationship building as political activity itself.  He 
argues that the IAF, rather than building coalitions to affect policy making processes, “draws its 
members into bridging relationships that cross lines of difficult difference, proliferate new 
democratic practices, and forge new political configurations…”138 
 To facilitate this proliferation of difference, Coles argues for a shift from a voice-based 
theory of democracy to a focus on listening and receptivity.  He argues that most democratic 
theories, responding to the inability of certain groups and individuals to leave oppressive or 
unjust institutions, focus on expanding democratic practice by empowering marginalized 
voices.139  His criticism concedes the value of these projects, as critical to the type of dialogical 
ethos that he advocates, but argues that these theories ignore the other crucial aspect of a 
dialogue: receptivity.140  Without paying attention to those listening in a dialogue to these newly 
empowered voices, it is difficult to see how such empowerment would be successful.  An 
unreceptive participant creates the same effect as a disempowered voice; it is the intersection of 
these two facets that creates a dialogue. 
 Returning to the IAF, Coles argues that they are most successful when focusing on 
practices of receptivity before working to articulate the voice of a marginalized group or 
coalition of groups.141  They focus on cross-cutting dialogues with the idea of listening to those 
from various religious, political, and social groups that will bridge difference.  Furthermore, in 
each community, IAF members must cultivate different methods of receptivity to account for the 
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variety of compositions of difference in any given context.142  To facilitate this receptivity, the 
IAF focuses on one-on-one meetings with members of the community in which they are 
working.  In such meetings, active members work, not to persuade the other of the values of the 
IAF, but to facilitate the other to share her own perspectives, feelings, emotions, histories, and 
responses to various issues facing these communities.  “These questions often catch people off 
guard.  They often open lines of dialogue, paths of relationship, and political possibility that 
might otherwise be tight shut.”143  As such, Coles’s model works to let others present their own 
voices in a system, not of competition and compromise, but of almost unmediated receptivity.   
 Coles, does not conceive of receptivity purely as a means to expand political discourse, 
but as a political activity.  By shifting the focus from speech to receptivity, Coles hopes to 
reformulate potential answers to political and social problems.  The root of a problem may not be 
that some group is unable to voice their opinions, but that individuals are unwilling to listen to 
such marginalized voices.  “If democratic voices are weak in a community, it is probably 
significantly because efforts to develop political voice have neither dwelled in nor sufficiently 
passed through the arts of listening.”144  To facilitate receptivity as a political process, Coles 
argues for the need to literally temporarily relocate oneself to engage in a dialogue with the 
other.  For even if one is attempting to be attentive and receptive, remaining in the same place, 
both conceived physically and metaphorically, can prevent true receptivity.  There will always be 
voices that one is unable to hear.  Furthermore, “the effort becomes not to exit one’s place or set 
of associational relations altogether but, rather, to escape from the oblivion and gated structures 
within which one’s self, capacity to receive the others, place, and associations have been largely 
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confined.”145  This involves moving out of one’s comfort zone, and engaging the other not in a 
neutral public space, but in the other’s environment and context.  This aids receptivity to move 
beyond simple listening, and become a broader attunement to the differences in others.  By 
moving the site of the dialogue away from preferred locations, citizens allow themselves to be 
transformed by the engagement, with the hope of shifting their predispositions when they return 
to their own homes.146 
 This focus on travelling also allows Coles to mount a strong critique against deliberative 
democratic theorists.  He argues that deliberative theorists focus almost myopically on bringing 
various groups to the table.  In doing so, they “rarely articulate ideals that would have us 
permanently and strenuously address questions of how to illuminate and respond to the 
significant exclusions that will probably reemerge in spite of —or because of—the configuration 
of participants, norms, and modes of the deliberative table itself.”147  He worries that even an 
expanding public deliberative table may continue to be exclusive to groups or individuals who 
are well out of the mainstream of political discourse.  Attempts to move deliberation to the 
public sphere still retain the spirit of a single collective table, falling susceptible to Coles’s 
critique.  Coles argues that cultivating a truly receptive and generous democratic ethos, requires 
replacing a single table with a multiplicity of proliferating tables.  “It calls us both to move the 
table around and to let the table be moved around us, and it sets in motion an endless 
multiplication of its being.”148  This proliferation of tables involves subjects moving out from 
their own locations of privilege, receptively engaging the other in her own context.  Multiple 
moving tables work to break down the idea of a homogenous demos, making subjects vulnerable 
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and exposed to difference in a way that a sterilized neutral deliberative table never can.  By being 
exposed to the actual conditions and circumstances that shape the voice of the other, subjects are 
exposed to more than they would in a traditional deliberation.  This conception of tabling allows 
subjects to “begin to create a volume of democratic experience and practice that is richer, more 
just, and more susceptible to moving and to being moved receptively beyond its limits.”149 
 These two key tenets, receptivity and tabling, can be expressed in a myriad of practices 
designed at fostering relationships with both citizens and non-citizens from divergent 
backgrounds.  This section will not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of methods of self-
cultivation, but to gesture towards possible engagements in which citizens can participate.  One 
valuable example is that of service-learning, in which formal education is combined with civic 
engagement to create more politically active citizens.  While service-learning is traditionally 
aimed at complimenting political education with experiences designed to encourage more 
political participation, Eric Gorham argues that service-learning can be expanded to cultivate 
students as political actors.150  Gorham believes that service-learning should be a system that 
values “how well the student recognizes oneself as a citizen and by how well one helps constitute 
and maintain public spaces permitting other student-citizens to appear.”151  For Gorham, the 
value of service-learning is that students shift their conceptions of politics from an object of 
knowledge, to an activity.  This conception of service-learning can also help students cultivate 
themselves as citizens through exposure to difference.  “Service-learning countersocializes 
students by placing them in situations unfamiliar to them as traditional classroom 
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participants.”152  Similar to Coles’s theory of tabling, service-learning moves students outside of 
their normal environments and thrusts them into situations in which they are citizens rather than 
students.  In these engagements with others in various contexts, students’ opinions and 
perspectives are challenged, forcing them to reconceive their previous political notions.153  
 One can expand this conception beyond service-learning to other programs that foster 
community engagement intending to benefit both the community as well as participating 
citizens, such as Teach for America, Americorps, the Peace Corps, and other service and 
volunteer organizations.  Cross-cultural dialogues and face-to-face confrontations with others, 
though not the intention of these programs, can help citizens cultivate generosity and forbearance 
towards others.  However, caring for oneself should not be limited to participating in formal 
organizations, but applied to the level of interpersonal relationships.  Recalling the discussion of 
White from Chapter 1, the temptations to otherize extend out of formal political environments 
and into micropolitical realm.  Everyday situations present themselves as potential opportunities 
to relapse back towards one’s prejudices and preconceived identity claims.  At the same time, 
these provide potential sites of dialogue and engagement with others.  Shifting towards the 
micropolitical sphere, also proliferates the number of the sites of dialogue for self-cultivation, 
but still requires citizens to take advantage of these sites.  These sites can range from active 
dialogue with difference, such as participating in a community forum on a controversial issue or 
having conversations with those of different political or religious beliefs, to more passive 
engagements, such as attending a foreign film or art exhibit or hosting one’s new neighbors for 
dinner.  The importance isn’t on the mode of the engagement, but the manner in which citizens 
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approach these sites.  Receptively approaching these engagements can help citizens gain an 
appreciation for the differences in others, working towards, in White’s words, “cultivating a 
sensibility that sees individuals, families, and ways of life, not collective types.”154 
There is a clear danger in this account, however, of “slum tourism.”  Writing about his 
own experiences growing up in a Nairobi slum, Kennedy Odebe warns of the dangers of affluent 
Western citizens “touring” poor areas to promote social awareness.  “Slum tourism turns poverty 
into entertainment, something that can be momentarily experienced and escaped from.  People 
think they’ve really ‘seen’ something—and then go back to their lives and leave me, my family 
and my community right where we were before.”155  Odebe fears that such engagements will 
devolve into voyeurism, in which poor or otherwise marginalized groups are treated not as 
human beings, but as spectacles to be observed and photographed without receiving any real 
assistance.156  Instead of the engagement transforming the subject, there is a risk that it may be 
used as a catharsis, as citizens may believe that they have “done their part.”   
While I acknowledge that this is a real threat to such a project, especially with Coles’s 
theory stressing the physical relocation of these dialogues to the homes of others, I believe that it 
is less of a risk when taken in the context of my project.  Citizens are engaging in these dialogues 
not with the general goal of increasing “social awareness” to problems facing undocumented 
immigrants, starving children in underdeveloped countries, or other marginalized groups, but 
with the specific goal of cultivating themselves.  These citizens are hoping to challenge their own 
identities and prejudices, and replacing statistics and broad group identities with faces and stories 
can help in this process.  Furthermore, unlike slum tourists, citizens are to engage in these 
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dialogues receptively; instead of viewing those encountered as objects, they are to actively listen 
to the stories and histories of the people encountered.  While I concede that not every citizen will 
be able to immediately approach such engagements with this predisposition, my hope is that a 
project of reflective self-cultivation will aid citizens in resisting the temptations of voyeurism. 
II: Dialogue, Difference, and Self-Cultivation 
 Cultivating oneself requires gaining self-knowledge.  What is valuable about a mirror in 
self-cultivation is the way in which it represents subjects to themselves, therefore allowing a 
subject to see herself differently.  Furthermore, just as mirrors at a carnival can provide distorted 
images, the “surface” of these metaphorical mirrors is important as they can alter the reflection.  
This is why engagement with difference is critical for self-cultivation.  Dialogues with one’s 
friends, or within one’s comfort zone or identity group, will project a comfortable safe image of 
oneself.  These engagements will not meaningfully change the way that subjects perceive 
themselves.  However, looking at oneself through a different medium can cast the self in a 
radically different light.  Both by exposing different modes of being outside of one’s own as well 
as showing commonalities between identities that once seemed oppositional, these mirrors 
demonstrate the contingency of identity.157  This recognition of a contingent identity is critical 
for developing an ethos of forbearance and attunement towards difference.  Once identity is 
problemataized the potential for “increasing tolerance for a range of antinomies in oneself, 
countering the demand to treat close internal unity,” is increased.158 
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 Coles’s notions of receptivity and tabling are valuable as they articulate practical ways 
that one can reflect back upon oneself.  By approaching the other in a receptive manner, the other 
becomes a way for the subject to reflect back upon her own prejudices.  This may seem counter-
intuitive as Coles’s focus seems to be on the other, and allowing her to express her own being.  
However, Coles argues that this receptivity is also supposed to have a transformative effect on 
the subject.  As argued above, by being receptive to the difference in others, subjects’ 
predispositions are challenged in ways that that are intended to aid them in being presumptively 
generous while engaging difference.  Furthermore, just as the subject sees both the mirror and 
her own reflection in the mirror, being receptive to others involves seeing oneself in the other’s 
context.159  By seeing oneself in the other, she is able to see both the contingency of her own 
identity claims as well as commonalities between herself and those she encounters.  This dual 
aspect, of seeing herself and seeing the other, can help inculcate forbearance and restraint when 
she encounters difference in other contexts. 
Moving the dialogue away from a neutral public table to where the other dwells also 
facilitates the self-cultivation.  On a basic level, this process works to bring citizens in contact 
with others who can be engaged in dialogue for self-reflection.  This can solve the problem of 
exposing citizens to difference; if they merely engage those in their own associations, 
friendships, and contexts it is conceivable that their prejudices may not be challenged, but 
possibly even strengthened.  By shifting the site of the dialogue away from just those closest to 
ourselves, we become vulnerable to difference, therefore allowing ourselves to recognize the 
contingency of the beliefs we hold.  This vulnerability is critical for citizens to be truly receptive; 
outside of either their own comfortable homes or a neutral deliberative table, citizens are plunged 
into a world that can be alien to them.  They become reliant on the generosity of the host of their 
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dialogue, who is able to perceive this unsettling vulnerability.160  This works to subvert and alter 
the previous power relationship of guest and host, as the other becomes the one upon which the 
subject is dependent.  Furthermore, by engaging the other in her own home, citizens are able to 
better see themselves in the other’s context, problematizing their conceptions of self and other.  
Coles believes that by travelling to the other’s home and listening receptively to her, citizens can 
get “into her skin,” picturing themselves differently.  This imagination can help citizens 
reformulate their conceptions of identity, allowing them to be more presumptively generous 
when encountering difference. 
 In addition to cultivating democratic citizens, these dialogues can help to pluralize the 
demos and sustain an “agonistic” democracy that avoids “antagonism.”  During one’s attempts to 
problematize strict identity claims and make present various types of competing identity claims 
and modes of being, one must be wary of collapsing into a Schmittian friend/enemy distinction.  
Here unfettered agonism coalesces into strict binaries in which groups define themselves as 
struggling against some enemy that must be defeated.161  Deliberative democrats attempt to solve 
this problem through institutional frameworks that protect minorities from antagonism.162  Self-
cultivation can also provide a way to temper antagonism.  First, by problematizing strong 
identity claims, self-cultivation weakens ties within the “friend” group.  Cracks and fissures 
emerge and difference can be located even within seemingly homogenous groups.  Second, 
engaging in cross-identity dialogue brings commonalities forward across seemingly diverse 
groups.  To use Connolly’s language, this helps restrain the urges both to “ethicize or 
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universalize the entrenched contingencies on the grounds that they flow from a true identity” and 
to “purge the entrenched contingency…because it is unworthy of ethiciziation.”163  By exposing 
the contingencies in identity, cultivating oneself prevents identity from being used to either unite 
a people against some enemy or to create an enemy out of difference. 
 There remain, however, dangers to this approach.  It can be argued that this approach is 
vulnerable to the same critique I made of Stephen White in Chapter 1.  While this model does 
provide a method of self-cultivation, it still presupposes that individuals will take it upon 
themselves to engage in this project. It also requires that citizens already have certain 
predispositions towards presumptive generosity before engaging in the actions of receptive 
tabling.  Furthermore, those who do not have at least a disposition towards tolerance and 
pluralism could react negatively to such engagements with others.  Instead of listening 
receptively, they may fall back on their own prejudices essentially negating any positive effect of 
the dialogue.  While this could present a damaging critique to my project, I believe that my 
particular articulation of an ethos of presumptive generosity can confront most of this criticism.  
My articulation of caring for oneself is linked with an idea of Socratic friendship.  As I argued in 
Chapter 2, Socrates served as Alcibiades’s first mirror, using the elenchic method to prod 
Alcibiades into examining himself.  Similarly, in a contemporary context, friends should still be 
used as the first mirror as they can incubate democratic sentiments.  Citizens can engage in 
dialogues within their own social groups and associations that can expose them to difference, 
while still within comfortable and familiar locations.  Citizens can begin to cultivate an 
appreciation of difference, by engaging those similar to them, before confronting the radically 
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different.164  While there is still a danger of such engagements being unsuccessful, using 
friendship should help to alleviate such concerns. 
 Another potential danger is that the focus on both attunement towards difference and on 
micropolitical action can be problematic at the level of politics proper.  As noted earlier, winning 
is important in political decision-making, and often these decisions entail the distribution of 
limited goods and resources.  This seems to preclude an attunement for difference, as political 
decisions will inevitably benefit some more than, or even at the expense of, others.  Dryzek 
echoes this concern in his critique of Mouffe; “She [Mouffe] scorns consensus as a cover for 
power, but at least consensus implies that decisions can get made.”165  Furthermore, there is a 
danger that an almost exclusive focus on micropolitics can have disastrous results.  As those 
concerned with toleration and justice are working to cultivate themselves, there is a risk that they 
may cede decision making processes to those with malicious intentions.166  Both of these 
critiques point to the danger that caring for oneself may not be able to affect change at the level 
of politics proper.  It may remain simply as an aesthetic, rather than political, exercise. 
 While I find these concerns important, I believe that the dangers should not be overstated.  
The risk of political apathy exists, but is minimized by the intention of self-cultivation.  Caring 
for oneself is to inculcate in oneself a political ethos that is designed to shift one’s 
predispositions upon entering into political relationships.  An ethos of presumptive generosity 
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helps citizens restrain themselves others from viewing them as a threat.  Though caring for 
oneself takes place outside of directly political environments, it has explicitly political 
consequences.  Citizens engaging in these practices will approach political problems differently.  
Instead of rushing to build consensus and inadvertently marginalizing difference to gain political 
victories, citizens who have engaged in cultivating themselves approach political decisions with 
forbearance. As Connolly notes, “A democratic culture that disrupts dogmatic identities opens up 
possibilities for a politics of pluralization: it increases the number of positive identities and 
changes the tone of contention and collaboration between constituencies.”167  Political debates 
can become less adversarial; those on the other side of the aisle are viewed not as enemies but as 
collaborators in a democratic project.  This undertaking becomes a perpetual project that resists 
totalizing political solutions and instead embraces ambiguity and indeterminacy.168 
 Furthermore, I contend that drawing a strong distinction between macro and 
micropolitical action, and elevating the former at the expense of the latter, is itself problematic.  
Following White’s discussion of Mill in Chapter 1, I argue that the dangers of oppression are not 
constituted solely in state institutions or actions.  Difference can be encountered in a variety of 
contexts, from waiting in a checkout line in a grocery store to going for a walk at a public park.  
In these “non-political” activities there exists the risk to fall back upon one’s old prejudices.  
Drawing stark distinctions between the micropolitical sphere and politics proper can mask these 
potential sites of oppression.  As Deleuze and Guattari note, “It’s too easy to be antifascist on the 
molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish 
and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.”169  Instead of drawing this binary, I 
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believe that it is necessary to problematize the strict divisions between political activity and 
apolitical activity, public and private, and macro and micro.  Self-cultivation should be 
understood as a micropolitical activity that both prepares citizens for interactions in formal 
political ventures, but also helps to temper impulses to force others out of the public sphere. 
 These tensions illustrate the dangers and challenges of self-cultivation.  Citizens must 
keep these tensions in mind while caring for themselves; they must be continually wary of their 
own latent fundamentalisms and utilize these dialogues and engagements to inform their political 
decisions.  These tensions and challenges are inevitable as the project of self-cultivation involves 
questioning and reformulating one’s own relationship to herself, as well as challenging the 
deeply held beliefs that have come to constitute her identity.  This may not be a process that 
every citizen can engage in, as not all citizens will be willing, or able, to challenge these 
identities.  This should not be viewed as a flaw in my argument.  I believe that even if only a 
small number of citizens care for themselves, an ethos of presumptive generosity can start 
shifting presuppositions of political debates.  While this project clearly cannot resolve all 
political disputes, it suggests ways to reformulate political questions.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
change the ‘I’ that is each of us.  Transformations of ‘structures’ will soon follow.”  Jayan Nayar, “Orders of 
Inhumanity,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 9 (Fall, 1999): 599-631, 630. 
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Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
 In this project I suggest that citizens in late-modern democracies take up the Socratic 
project of putting everything, even our deepest claims to identity and selfhood, to question.  This 
project should not be seen as a purely critical exercise designed at undermining all foundations 
for liberal governance, but rather, as a way to reground and reenergize democratic sentiments.  
By subjecting themselves to continual questioning and critique, citizens can uncover and 
problematize their own prejudices, working towards cultivating a more generous and receptive 
citizenry.  This citizenry can work both to challenge social oppression and stigmatization in the 
public sphere and to influence formal decision making processes towards issues previously 
marginalized.  Caring for oneself is intended to be a directly political activity designed to 
cultivate democratic citizens able to withstand the challenges facing late-modern democracies. 
 I attempt in this project to advance three arguments.  First, citizenship should not be 
understood simply as something that one checks off on a tax form, but something that must 
always be worked at, but can never be truly perfected.  By caring for themselves, individuals 
come to understand that citizenship is something that requires continual action upon the self, by 
the self.  Second, in response to the challenges of late-modernity, citizens should cultivate an 
ethos of presumptive generosity based on the active presencing of difference.  Self-cultivation 
works to challenge static notions of identity, inculcating an appreciation of the constant interplay 
of identity\difference.  Third, to cultivate such an ethos, citizens must utilize a mirror that allows 
them to gain greater understanding of themselves.  Through the use of Socratic friendship and a 
dialogue with radical difference, late-modern citizens have a variety of potential mirrors that they 
can use to cultivate themselves. 
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 There are several potential avenues for future research.  The first is a greater examination 
of the concept of “Socratic friendship.”  This would involve an investigation of eros in Plato’s 
Symposium, as well as an examination of the “true rhetoric” of the Gorgias.  In addition, the 
Apology and Crito could be examined to analyze the relationship between citizens caring for 
themselves and sources of authority.  The second avenue is far broader.  It involves an 
investigating a variety of other articulations of caring for oneself to explore techniques other than 
those discussed in this project.  These investigations could include Aristotle’s conception of 
friendship in the Niccomachean Ethics, Augustine’s work upon the self in the Confessions, 
Nietzsche’s theory of self-overcoming, and Heidegger’s account of authenticity, among others.  
These investigations could help provide a more robust account of the care of the self as a 
political project.  Additionally work could be done in the field of political psychology to 
empirically study the effects of dialogue and exposure on challenging prejudices.  While these 
potential projects remain, I hope, in this current paper, to have gestured towards ways that 
citizens can cultivate themselves in late-modern democracies and the ways in which this practice 
can help progress political discourse towards greater toleration, pluralism, and generosity.  
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